Single Question. Whether there are seminal reasons in matter

Bonaventure, Sent. 2 d.18 q.2 a.1
Scotus, Sent. 2 d.18 q.1
Thomas, ST Ia q.115 a.2
Richard of St. Victor, Sent. 2 d.18 q.3
Durandus, Sent.2 d.18 q.2
John Bacconitanus, Sent.2 d.18 q.1

1. About the eighteenth distinction the question asked is whether there is in matter a seminal reason for the form that is to be educed from it.

2. That there is: because otherwise the form would be created, for its formal term ‘from which’ would be nothing and would be simply annihilated in corruption, for it returns to that from which it began; therefore a natural agent would be able to annihilate and create.

3. Again generation is natural; nature is a principle of change in that in which it is, Physics 2 text 3, and the form is more nature than matter is; therefore there is something inchoative in matter, which was the form.

4. On the contrary: no inchoative principle is the same with respect to diverse and opposed forms, and this because opposite forms would then agree in something - for they differ in this inchoative principle and in that one and thereby are they opposite - and so neither form will be simple in its composite essence. Or there are different inchoative principles - and not this either, because several specific substantial forms, whether in diminished or intense being, are not able to inform the same matter at the same time.

To the Question

5. I reply that some [Albert the Great, see Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 4 q.14], wanting to avoid the creation of natural forms, posit seminal reasons in matter, which they say are not the essence of the matter, nor a potency susceptive of matter that is the same really as the matter, because neither of these is form; but they say the seminal reason is a certain potential co-created with matter, which becomes act and works from within, along with the natural agent, to educe the form.

6. This is confirmed by the Philosopher, Physics 2[3] text 3, where he distinguishes between natural and artificial things, and says that natural things have truly a principle of change within, but artificial things do not; but this cannot be understood of the passive principle, because artificial things have that.

7. Again, in Ethics 3.1, he says that the violent is that whose principle is from without, when the passive thing contributes none of the force, and so it is formally from without;     therefore , contrariwise, natural change, while formally from without, has in the passive thing a principle from within acting with it and contributing some of the force. Again the Commentator on Metaphysics 8 text 15 says that a generator does not bestow manyness but perfection; nor would it bestow manyness unless there were something preexistent in the matter, which would be the form; therefore etc     .

8. On the contrary: there are two motives for this opinion: one to avoid a creator of form, the other to save the difference between natural and artificial things.

9. Against the first motive I argue as follows: the whole form preexists in the matter either in the way it has being after it has been educed, or after a part of it has been educed; or the whole form preexists in another way, namely in potency. The first is impossible because then nothing would be acquired by generation. The second too is impossible because then creation of the part of the form would not be avoided, for the part does not preexist. The third also is impossible because then creation of the mode that the form has after it has been educed would not be avoided, for the mode was not preexistent; for if it was preexistent, I ask how it was so, and then I argue as before. And the point is plain because then generation will be a modification only.

10. Again, the second motive takes away the first, because from the second motive is plain that nothing of artificial form preexists in the mater, so it is created.

11. Again, it would then be necessary that in any matter there were infinite such potential forms, for matter is in potency to infinite forms.

12. Again, there is a confirmation of the first [n.9]: if nothing altogether new is educed by generation that did not preexist in the matter, then generation and the actuation of second natural agents would be pointless.

13. To the second [n.10] it might perhaps be said that the substantial form also exists in the subject in potency but does not work along with the artisan, and hereby the difference is preserved. But this is not valid, because no reason is apparent why it would not work along with it just as the other does, if it were to preexist like the other.

14. To the second [n.11] it might be said that only as many forms, and no more, exist as there are species of things for which it is in potency; for it is not in potency to any new form that is not in the universe, for one form suffices for the whole species. But this does not seem natural. For I ask: either the forms that preexist are nothing, and then     etc .; or they are an accident, and this is not the case because accident is not substance; or they are substance, and this is not the case because diverse forms of diverse ideas, however diminished, are not compossible together in the same thing, unless they are subordinate; therefore          etc .

15. I say therefore      that the first motive provides no necessity to posit that anything of the form preexists that may become the total form (on the ground that creation and annihilation mean that that is created which nothing of preexists). But, as it is, things are such that the form does not generate, either per se or in matter, but the composite is generated, and generation terminates per se at the composite, Metaphysics 7 text 26. Something, however, of the composite preexists, because the matter preexists; and likewise the composite is corrupted, some part of which does remain, namely the matter. For there is no difficulty on the part of soul or substance, because, as was said in the previous distinction [d.17 q.1], the soul is per se created in the first instant of nature and is infused in the second instant of nature, although the whole comes to be in the same instant of duration.

16. Against the second motive I argue as follows: the preexistent form is of the same idea as the educed form, otherwise the form educed would be a composite of entities of diverse ideas, and the preexistent form would be more imperfect than the educed form, otherwise it would be educed to no purpose. But it is impossible that an imperfect being is a co-agent in the production of a perfect being of the same idea, or in the production of itself into perfect existence.

17. Again, if the agent contains in its power the form in its perfect being, then it contains it in its imperfect being, since it is of the same idea.

18. Again, the inchoative principle of form, which you posit to be acting, only acts if excited by an extrinsic natural agent, otherwise generation would always act; in the first instant in which the extrinsic agent begins to act, the intrinsic agent, namely the inchoative form, does not act; and afterwards there is natural action.

19. To the point brought in from Physics 2 text 3 [n.6], I say that the difference between artificial things and natural things is taken from the side both of the active principle and of the passive principle; because a natural agent acts necessarily and uniformly, as is said of fire, but a deliberately choosing agent does not, but is able not to act and to act differently. On the part of the passive principle too, because a natural passive principle is naturally inclined to act thus and not otherwise, but an artificial passive principle is in neutral potency and is sometimes inclined to the opposite, as is plain about wood in making a chest or ship out of it.

20. To the point from Ethics 3.1 [n.7] I say that the condition ‘the passive thing contributing none of the force’ must be understood of natural inclination and not of active doing, such that the principle of forced motion is so disposed to the passive thing that it does not violently give it an inclination for that motion, for then the motion would not be violent.

21. To the point from the Commentator [n.7], I say that the generator does not bestow manyness but perfection, for it does not produce the form in matter but produces a perfect whole composite.

22. We need now therefore to see what a seminal reason is. I say that in nature there is a triple production. One is equivocal, as when the sun produces a frog, and in this case a seminal reason in respect of the thing produced is not required. Another is immediate univocal production, as when fire produces fire, and a seminal reason is not required in this case. Another one is mediate univocal production, namely by means of propagation, and a seminal reason is needed in this case. And then I say that the seminal reason is the substantial form either of the seed of the man or of the woman or of neither, as in plants. Or it is some natural quality naturally containing the substantial form of the seed, and it is called a seminal reason because it is not what is per se intended by the agent but it is a seminary or preliminary to further form - as is plain, because the form of the seed in the mother is ordained to the form of blood, and this to the form of the embryo, and thus is there a containing of it.

23. But that this seminal reason is not an active principle with respect to the form, but only a passive one, I show chiefly as follows: what does not exist cannot act; but, in the instant in which the form is generated, the further form of the seed is corrupted and consequently does not exist (for a thing does not exist when it is corrupted);     therefore the form of the seed is not an agent for the generation.

24. Again the formal active principle is not imperfect in the formal term produced; but a further form is always more imperfect than the former one; therefore etc     .

25. You will say to this that it acts in virtue of the principal agent. On the contrary: nothing can act in virtue of what does not exist, but the principal agent can be dead after the seed has been deposited;     therefore etc     .

26. You will say that it acts in virtue of the heavens, or that the heavens act. On the contrary: some produced forms are more perfect than the form of the heavens;     therefore etc     .

27. Recourse then must be had to an angel or to God, but more so to God. Hence I say that, once seed has been deposited and the principal agent is dead, there are active dispositions, and from then on every form that is introduced is effectively from God; but there is no need that creation happens, because not every action of God need be creation. For he can produce a natural composite by producing the form from the potency of matter in just the way a natural agent would do; for he can do by himself immediately what he can also do by means of a secondary efficient cause; therefore only the intellective soul, which is the most perfect soul, is created; and the fact that recourse must be had to God in such cases is plain from the Commentator On the Heavens 2 text 69ff.

28. Galen in his solution to these difficult questions also calls the virtues of the seeds divine. The point is plain from what has been said, because there was in the rib of Adam no seminal reason for drawing Eve out of it.

To the Arguments

29. The response to the principal arguments is plain from what has been said. But note that according to Avicenna the seed itself acts. For he says that the seed is the virtue of the principal agent, and so the principal agent acts by acting it. And hereby does he solve the aforesaid arguments. For if the principal agent dies after depositing seed there is no problem, because his virtue remains; and hereby is also plain that the produced term is not more perfect than the producer etc.